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Consumers often transact with imperfect information about the best price available for a
product. Some examples are mundane—a shopper does not know the price of kleenex at
every nearby store. Others are more substantial, such as the best available price for a new
Ford Focus or the best expense ratio for an S&P 500-indexed mutual fund. We study a
large expenditure that the majority of consumers make only a few times in their lives, the
payment for mortgage origination services. These payments range from zero to $30,000 for
mortgages of normal size. The payments are described as “origination fees,” “points,” and a
myriad of other terms; frequently the borrower pays for a dozen or more diﬀerent categories
of origination services. On average among the loans we study, about half of the value that
the borrower transfers to the broker takes the form of a payment by the wholesale lender
to the mortgage broker. The borrower bears the burden of this part of the payment in the
form of a higher interest rate on the loan.
These payments are compensation to mortgage brokers for their services in arranging
the origination of a mortgage. Because consumers enter the mortgage market infrequently
and because of features of the market that make it diﬃcult to learn the best price, mortgage
origination pricing is a leading example of a market where one suspects that many consumers
pay well above the best price. Our results conﬁrm this suspicion strongly.
We stress that this paper is about how much borrowers pay their brokers for origination
services. The broker is an administrator of the process of loan origination. The broker bears
none of the risk of default on the mortgage, so that risk is not a determinant of the broker’s
compensation.
We reach our conclusion by studying the distribution of origination charges for a large
sample of mortgages involving brokers, where federally mandated disclosure documents re-
port the entire amount of the broker’s revenue, including both the total charges imposed on
the borrower and the additional amount the lender pays the broker. We consider a mini-
mal shopping strategy that borrowers might pursue in trying to ﬁnd the best price—getting
quotes from two brokers, asking the one with the higher proposed price to beat the lower
price of the opponent, and continuing this process until one broker is unwilling to improve
on the other’s best proposal. This process is an English auction, in which the lower-cost
broker gets the business and the charge equals the cost of the losing broker, according to
standard auction principles.
It’s a standard statistical exercise to ﬁnd the distribution of a variable from the distribu-
tion of the larger of a pair of draws from the variable. We perform that exercise to calculate
the distribution of broker cost. We ﬁnd that the implied cost is generally quite high, but
more important, the upper tail of the cost distribution is thick—a signiﬁcant fraction of
mortgages appear to cost the broker more than $5,000 to originate. When we repeat the
2exercise for shopping among three and four brokers, we ﬁnd that the implied distribution of
cost is completely implausible, with an even larger fraction implied to cost more than $5,000.
The distribution has an implausible shape as well. We conclude that among our shopping
models, only the one where borrowers shop from just a pair of brokers is close to reasonable.
Our conclusion that borrowers consider no more than two mortgages draws support from
surveys of borrower behavior as well.
Given this conclusion, we ask what beneﬁt a borrower who shopped from only two brokers
passed up by not shopping from three or four. The answers are so large that we believe that
many of the borrowers must have been unaware of the likely beneﬁts of more shopping.
For example, for a mortgage with $100,000 principal, a borrower would save a median of
$981 by adding one more broker to the mix and $1,393 by adding two. And with $200,000
principal, the savings are $1,866 and $2,664 . Because we do not believe that borrowers
would intentionally pass up such large beneﬁts just to avoid talking to another broker, we
conclude that confusion about how this market works caused borrowers to shop too little.
Our second approach to studying confusion among mortgage borrowers is to compare (1)
the total closing charges for loans where the borrower pays a higher interest rate to fund
the closing charge to (2) the total charges for loans where the borrower pays all of those
charges in cash. The ﬁrst group pays somewhat lower total charges than the second, but the
important ﬁnding is that both those groups pay far less than borrowers who use both types
of funding in roughly equal proportion. This evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that
borrowers treat the two charges independently, failing to recognize that a borrower who pays
more cash is entitled to a lower interest rate and vice versa.
Earlier research has shown that mortgage charges are higher for less-educated borrowers,
members of minorities, borrowers who pay high interest rates, and those who borrow larger
principal amounts—we review that research in the Appendix. We conﬁrm these ﬁndings. The
research has not shown whether the borrowers paying higher charges did so because arranging
the mortgage broker’s cost was higher or because those borrowers suﬀered exploitation due
to their lack of knowledge of the best available charge, which should be little higher than
cost. Our results show that large fractions of the higher charges are the result of limited
shopping rather than higher cost.
Our data come from a sample of mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA) during a six-week period in 2001. The FHA insures mortgages of fairly
creditworthy borrowers for modestly priced houses, up to loan limits that vary by geogra-
phy. The data report the amount that the borrower paid for mortgage-related charges at the
closing, the principal amount that the lender paid into the closing, the yield-spread premium,
and the interest rate for the mortgage. All of these loans are 30-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages
for the purchase of a house.
Our econometric approach is mainly non-parametric. We represent the full distribution
3of closing charges in terms of 299 quantiles, conditional on observed borrower and loan
characteristics. From the quantiles, we make calculations of the distribution of broker cost
and of the charges that borrowers would have paid under more eﬀective shopping strategies.
We provide bootstrap standard errors for all of our calculations.
2 Economics of Mortgage Originations
A mortgage is a loan secured by a house. The typical mortgage provides for monthly pay-
ments over a term of 30 years. The amount of the loan, called the loan principal, transfers
to the seller of the house at the moment when the borrower takes ownership of the house,
called the loan closing. Our FHA sample contains only 30-year ﬁxed-rate mortgages for the
purchase of a home; there are no investor loans and no reﬁnancings among them. The bor-
rower’s coupon rate is applied to the principal amount of the loan to calculate the borrower’s
monthly payment. The loans are fully amortizing, so there is no ﬁnal repayment of principal,
in contrast to the typical bond. The borrower has the option to pay oﬀ a mortgage before
30 years, subject to a pre-payment penalty, which is limited by law in all states. Because
borrowers sometimes move, change houses, extract appreciated equity, and take advantage
of lower interest rates to reﬁnance, most mortgages pre-pay prior to their 30-year maturity.
Nonetheless, roughly 30 percent of owner-occupied homes have no mortgage, and nearly all
got to this state by paying oﬀ a 30-year loan—see U.S. Census Department (2001).
2.1 Brokers and the yield-spread premium
Mortgage brokers perform the service of originating a mortgage. A broker matches a bor-
rower with a wholesale lender. The broker is not a party to the resulting ﬁnancial contract
between borrower and lender and thus bears none of the default risk of the mortgage. The
broker helps the borrower prepare an application and arranges for the services of one or more
appraisers and of an agent to close the transaction. The broker serves lenders by ﬁnding
potential borrowers and helping them complete the necessary paperwork. Most large lenders
have retail origination operations and also use brokers as originating agents. A broker usually
deals with a number of wholesale lenders.
The borrower deals with a broker under conditions comparable to a purchaser dealing
with a retailer of an expensive item. Like the retailer and purchaser, the broker and borrower
negotiate the terms of the transaction without participation from the upstream wholesaler.
The wholesaler provides funds for the loan under quoted terms. The borrower receives a
speciﬁed amount of cash, the principal amount of the mortgage, delivered by the lender at
the time of the closing, in exchange for a mortgage at an interest rate resulting from the
negotiation. The borrower may also pay the broker a negotiated amount at the closing; we
4call this the cash closing charge. Berndt, Holliﬁeld and Sand˚ as (2009) discuss the bargaining
problem between borrower and broker in the framework of the Nash bargain in its alternating
oﬀer form.
The broker may also receive a payment from the lender called the yield-spread premium
or YSP, which is often about half of the broker’s compensation. The terms oﬀered by the
wholesale lender appear in a rate sheet, a document the broker receives from the lender at
least daily. The rate sheet shows the YSP the lender oﬀers to pay the broker for originating
a mortgage. The YSP is an increasing function of the coupon rate and principal amount of
the loan, and decreasing in the term (15, 30, 45 or 60 days) for which the loan is locked (the
length of time the broker and borrower have the option to complete the loan). The YSP rises
as interest rates rise, but at a decreasing rate because higher rate loans are more likely to
prepay than lower rate loans, so higher rates are generally earned for shorter periods. This
function is determined by expectations about movements in interest rates in the competitive
wholesale mortgage market and the reﬁnancing choices of borrowers. We take it as given.
The following example, representative of the transactions in our data, illustrates the
operation of the YSP: A borrower pays her broker $1,500 as a cash closing payment. In
addition, the lender pays the broker a YSP of $2,300. The broker’s all-in cost, mainly the
value of his time, is $2,400. The borrower has paid $1,500 + $2,300 = $3,800 in closing
charges for a loan when she could have pressed the broker to do the loan for close to $2,400.
A savvy borrower could have insisted that the broker charge her only $100 in cash, which,
together with the yield-spread premium of $2,300, would have just covered his cost of $2,400.
Figure 1 shows an example of an actual rate sheet. The ﬁgures show the amount that
the lender will deliver at closing on behalf of the borrower (always taken to be 100) plus
the premium to be paid to the broker, such as 2.25 percent of the principal for a loan at
a coupon rate of 8 7/8 percent with a lock period of 30 days. Notice that below the solid
line, the YSP becomes negative. For loans at these low interest rates, the borrower (not the
broker) pays the speciﬁed amount of cash into the closing to make up the diﬀerence.
The coupon rate that corresponds to a zero YSP is called the par rate and is a useful
benchmark of mortgage interest rates. It corresponds to the row in the ﬁgure just below the
solid line.
2.2 Bargaining over mortgage terms
In this subsection, we explore the simple view that the borrower and the mortgage broker
make a bargain that maximizes their joint surplus. We let r be the coupon rate on the
mortgage, p(r) be the payment at annual rate for a 30-year amortized ﬁxed-rate mortgage at
coupon rate r, rb be the borrower’s personal discount rate, Y (r) be the yield-spread premium
available from wholesale lenders, per dollar of principal, L be the cash closing charge the
515 days 30 days 45 days 60 days
9.125% 103.375 103.250 103.125 103.000
9.000% 103.000 102.875 102.750 102.625
8.875% 102.625 102.500 102.375 102.250
8.750% 102.375 102.250 102.125 102.000
8.625% 102.000 101.875 101.750 101.625
8.500% 101.500 101.375 101.250 101.125
8.375% 101.000 100.875 100.750 100.625
8.250% 100.625 100.500 100.375 100.250
8.125% 100.250 100.125 100.000 99.875
8.000% 99.750 99.625 99.500 99.375
7.875% 99.125 99.000 98.875 98.750
7.750% 98.625 98.500 98.375 98.250
7.625% 98.250 98.125 98.000 97.875
7.500% 97.625 97.500 97.375 97.250
Lock period
Rate
Figure 1: An Actual Rate Sheet for April 2000
borrowers pays to the broker, T ∗ be the time (in years) to paying oﬀ the mortgage in the
mind of the borrower, A(r,T) be the remaining principal on a 30-year mortgage at coupon
rate r as of time T, V (r,T) be the present value of a $1 per year ﬂow lasting for T years
discounted at rate r, and ˜ V (r,T) be the present value of $1 T years from now.
The borrower’s net beneﬁt of the loan, per dollar of principal, is
1 − p(r)V (rb,T
∗) − A(r,T
∗)˜ V (r,T
∗) − L. (1)
The ﬁrst term is the beneﬁt of the principal supplied by the lender, the second is the present
value of the loan payments, the third is the present value of the payoﬀ of the principal at
T ∗, and the fourth is the cash closing payment to the broker.
The broker’s beneﬁt from originating the loan, per dollar of principal, is the total closing
charge less the broker’s cost, k,
Y (r)+L − k. (2)
The surplus is the sum of the borrower’s and broker’s beneﬁts,
1 − p(r)V (rb,T
∗) − A(r,T
∗)˜ V (r,T
∗)+Y (r) − k. (3)
The cash closing charge, L, drops out of the sum, so it does not appear in the rest of
the discussion. In terms of an Edgeworth-box analysis of this bargaining problem, the
maximization of the surplus places the parties on their contract curve and the choice of L
6picks a point on the contract curve. Maximization of the surplus is a matter of choosing the
coupon rate r or, equivalently, choosing the YSP, Y (r).
Lenders solve a complicated problem in setting the rate sheets that determine the YSP
as a function of the coupon rate, Y (r). The central factor is that a higher coupon rate
implies a higher present value of the payments, a beneﬁt that the broker shares through the
YSP. One important subsidiary factor is the likelihood of early payoﬀ of the mortgage from
the sale of the house or reﬁnancing. Payoﬀs tend to occur earlier for high-rate mortgages,
a factor the lender builds into the curvature of the YSP as a function of the coupon rate.
Because the present value of the payments on lower-coupon loans falls short of the amount
of the principal, the YSP will be negative below some coupon rate. Lenders also consider
any market power they may have in the wholesale market, though we believe this factor
is not very important—brokers know the quoted terms of numerous lenders every day for
identical mortgages, so the wholesale market has close to perfect Bertrand competition.
Lenders adjust their YSPs daily or even more often to modulate their lending ﬂows and
reﬂect changes in market rates.
Our best source of information about the YSP is a group of rate sheets from a dozen
large lenders for May 31, 2000. Figure 2 gives averages for May 31, 2000, for a 30-day lock
period, with a cost to the broker, k = $2500, which we believe is reasonable. The error bars
are one standard error—they become larger at both ends of the line because fewer lenders
quoted premiums so far from the popular interest rates. The ﬁgure shows the beneﬁt of the
loan to a hypothetical borrower with a discount rate of 9 percent per year, from equation
(1). The beneﬁts are based on a time to payoﬀ of T ∗ = 7 years, which we believe is typical.
Figure 2 shows how the joint surplus varies with the coupon interest rate. For the
case shown, it is clear that the eﬃcient loan would have the lowest interest rate the lender
oﬀers and thus the most negative YSP. The YSPs lenders oﬀer plainly undercompensates a
borrower for the higher payment of a loan with a positive YSP, if the borrower’s discount
rate is not too much higher than the coupon rate. A borrower who had enough cash in an
investment of equal risk to a mortgage, paying less than 10 percent per year, could use cash
withdrawn from that account to induce a broker to originate a loan with a large negative
YSP and come out ahead—the interest rate implicit in the YSP, under the assumptions of
these calculations, is higher than 10 percent. If the borrower expects to repay the loan in
much less than seven years, the opposite conclusion follows; the maximum surplus occurs
with a large YSP and no cash closing charge.
Figure 3 considers the relation between the coupon rate and the joint surplus for borrowers
at three coupon rates, with expected time to payoﬀ of 7 years. At the bottom is the same
surplus as in Figure 2. This borrower gains relatively little from the loan transaction, given
that the borrower’s discount rate is close to the rate of a mortgage that has zero YSP. This
borrower-broker pair is best oﬀ by choosing the lowest available coupon interest rate oﬀered
78
10





Borrower s benefit at 9 percent discount rate, not 



































YSPs from rate sheets, 2000, 
 8
 6 less broker's cost
7.5 8.0 8.5 9.0 9.5 10.0
Mortgage coupon interest rate, percent per year
Figure 2: The Yield-Spread Premium on May 31, 2000, Borrower’s Beneﬁt, and the Joint
Surplus
by the lender and using some of the resulting beneﬁt to the borrower to pay the lender the
corresponding negative YSP.
The middle line in Figure 3 shows the surplus to the pairing of a broker with a borrower
whose discount rate is 15 percent. The surplus is substantial—because the discounted cost
to the borrower of repaying the loan is less than the principal—but is essentially ﬂat across
the interest rates. Thus the provisions of the rate sheet achieve close to indiﬀerence in this
case, with the loan expected to last for 7 years and the borrower’s discount rate somewhat
above the par rate. The top line in the ﬁgure shows that, when the borrower has a discount
rate of 20 percent, the surplus is even higher and reaches a vaguely deﬁned maximum at 8
5/8 percent.
Figure 4 shows the same three lines for borrowers who plan to pay the loan oﬀ in 4 years.
In these cases, the surplus rises with the interest rates to maximums at 9 1/4 percent for the
low-discount borrower and 9 1/2 percent for the two higher-discount borrowers. It pays the
broker-borrower pair to take advantage of the higher YSP that goes with the higher coupon
rate, because the borrower only pays the higher rate for 4 years.
The basic message of the investigation of the joint surplus as a function of the interest
rate and resulting YSP is that lenders oﬀer YSP schedules in their rate sheets that make the
broker-borrower pair close to indiﬀerent to the interest rate if they plan to pay the loan oﬀ
in seven years. No compelling economic force tells the pair what rate to pick in that case.
Our data show fairly wide dispersion across rate categories, consistent with the lack of such
840
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Figure 4: Joint Surplus of Borrower and Broker for Three Borrower Discount Rates, 4-Year
Expected Mortgage Life
9a compelling force. Maximization of the joint surplus would push the terms toward higher
YSPs and lower cash closing charges if the borrower expects to repay in less than seven years
or has an unusually high discount rate.
The YSP lets the home-buyer borrow the funds to compensate the broker, provided the
borrower can qualify for a higher interest rate. The value ﬂowing from the borrower to
the broker is the cash closing charges plus the YSP. For the broker, the mix of the two
components is immaterial, as the broker receives both the cash closing charge and the YSP
as cash at the same time. A borrower who is cash-constrained and knows she is likely to
pay oﬀ the mortgage fairly soon will see the cost of the borrowed component resulting from
a higher interest as less than what the broker receives as YSP, so their eﬃcient bargain
should pay the broker entirely with the YSP and the closing charge should be zero (or even
negative, which occurs in a small fraction of our sample). Similarly, a borrower with a low
discount rate (and or expecting to be in the house for a long time) may see the cost of the
borrowed component as greater than the YSP and then the eﬃcient deal with the broker
will not involve borrowing any of the broker’s compensation; rather, the borrower will pay
it in cash, and even pay a negative YSP to lower the interest rate further.
2.3 Potential consumer confusion
Our predictions about the eﬃcient deal between borrower and broker rest on the assumption
that the borrower is able to recognize that she is paying a higher interest rate and thus
creating value that could be used to pay the broker in place of a cash closing charge. An
alternative model holds that some borrowers are unable to spot when an interest rate is high
enough to deserve a reduction in the closing charge and thus wind up paying both normal
closing charges and giving the brokers handsome YSPs as well. The value-maximizing broker
will try to keep borrowers uninformed about the availability of mortgages at lower interest
rates, in the hope of earning high compensation from both components.
The borrower’s information about the mortgage market is often incomplete. For mort-
gages on newly purchased homes, the buyer’s real-estate broker often refers the purchaser to
a mortgage broker, who explains that he has access to mortgages from dozens of competing
lenders and that he can help the borrower choose the one with the best terms. He does not
mention that each of these lenders oﬀers a link between the interest rate and the YSP that
he will receive. He proposes one or more mortgages, each with a rate that includes as big a
YSP as he thinks the borrower will accept. He pairs the rate proposal with a proposal for a
cash closing charge. His judgment on this question will turn on how careful and informed a
shopper he believes the borrower is.
Mortgage law requires that the broker provide the borrower at this stage in the process
a good-faith estimate of the closing charge, but not of the YSP. Thus the borrower does not
10know prior to making a deal with a mortgage broker how much the broker will earn in total
fees. The borrower may eventually learn the amount of the YSP, in principle, because the
law requires its disclosure at the time of the closing, on the HUD-1 form that is part of the
closing document package. The terminology of the disclosure and the location of the YSP
entry on the form may inhibit many borrowers from understanding the YSP, and, in any
case, the information arrives long after the mortgage deal is made.
2.4 Points
One important source of confusion among borrowers is the labeling of parts of cash closing
charges as “points.” A point is a component of the broker’s closing charge calculated as a
percent of the principal amount of the loan. From the perspective of the economics of a
mortgage origination, a charge for points is just part of the total that the borrower pays
to the broker. Borrowers may believe that paying points “buys down” the interest rate. In
principle, this should be true. If a broker receives part of his cash closing charge as points,
just as in any other form, the borrower should be able to bargain for a lower YSP and thus a
lower interest rate. But this only happens if the borrower uses the added bargaining power
that paying more cash to the broker ought to give the borrower. Nothing stops the broker
from oﬀering an interest rate that earns him a handsome YSP and also including a charge
for points as part of the pricing of the origination. In our sample, charges for points on loans
were present on roughly 30 percent of the loans with positive YSPs.
When the coupon rate is suﬃciently low that the YSP is negative, the borrower will face
a charge for points that goes to the lender. If the charge for points is the amount on the
rate sheet for the negative YSP (below the horizontal line in Figure 1), the charge genuinely
brings a lower interest rate. But here too, the broker may charge more for points than the
lender receives—nothing stops the broker from charging more for the negative YSP than
appears on the rate sheet and keeping the excess as part of his own compensation.
The borrower’s understanding of the cash closing charge may also be limited by the
practice of dividing the charge into many elements. Figure 5 is an example containing terms
found frequently in our data on mortgages. The good-faith disclosure form prevailing when
these loans were written did not require brokers to state the sum of the charges (new rules
do require disclosure of the sum), so comparison of loans was challenging. Some of the
challenge remains, because the disclosure law perversely allows for points to be separated
from other closing charges, suggesting that even the regulators fail to understand that points
are just another name for broker or lender charges. Borrowers may not recognize that only
the sum—including points—is meaningful. Lacko and Pappalardo (2007) found that few
borrowers had any idea what the term “discount points” means, and worse, that one-third
believed it was a discount they were receiving instead of an amount they were paying.
11Borrower signs up for 8.875% with a 60-day close, $100,000 loan
Lender delivers $100,000 on behalf of borrower
Broker gets
From lender:
2,000 yield-spread premium (paid outside of closing)
From borrower:
800 origination fee 
75 warehouse wire fee 
50 fee for preparing amortization table for loan
200 document processing charge
150 funding fee
25 fax fee
200 document review fee
500 commitment fee
4,000 TOTAL
Figure 5: Example of a loan transaction
2.5 Industrial organization analysis of mortgage brokerage
Our ﬁndings later in the paper demonstrate that an important fraction of borrowers leave a
lot of money on the table for their brokers. As we demonstrate later in the paper, the upper
tail of the distribution of origination charges brokers receive contains some astonishingly
large values. We use the term margin to mean the diﬀerence between the revenue from
originating a mortgage and the cost of executing the transaction. Here we include only costs
incurred after the broker meets the borrower and strikes a deal. The margin is the amount
at issue when the broker bargains with the borrower over the charge. Thus we believe that
mortgage brokers earn substantial margins from many but not all of their origination eﬀorts.
Mortgage brokerage involves only small out-of-pocket costs for the broker. A mortgage
broker does not usually outsource any of the origination process to other professionals. Fur-
ther, though charges labeled “origination fee,” “funding fee,” and “commitment fee” sound
as if they ﬂowed through to the lender, they remain ﬁrmly in the broker’s pocket. Thus the
costs we have in mind are largely the value of the broker’s time.
The equilibrium we describe is ineﬃcient. We do not believe that mortgage brokers
earn any important rents from their origination activities. Entry to mortgage brokerage
is close to free. Most states license mortgage brokers or require them to have licenses as
real-estate agents, but these licenses are not diﬃcult to obtain. Mortgage brokers dissipate
the anticipated margin from originating mortgages for borrowers who fail to shop carefully
by spending eﬀort and other resources trying to ﬁnd these customers. Because borrowers
seldom seek out several brokers to compete for the borrower’s business, brokers have to work
hard to ﬁnd brokerage customers. In Lacko and Pappalardo (2007), the modal number of
loans considered by borrowers was two. In Federal Reserve Board (2009), more than half of
12all borrowers looked seriously at only one loan.
We noted earlier that mortgage brokers often receive referrals from real-estate brokers and
that it appears that many borrowers accept a proposal from such a mortgage broker without
further shopping. Hence the referrals are valuable and mortgage brokers cultivate real-estate
brokers hoping to receive their referrals. Federal law—the Real Estate Settlement Practices
Act—prohibits mortgage brokers from paying referral fees, but little is known about the
eﬀectiveness or enforcement of that prohibition. In any case, we believe that the mortgage-
brokerage business is generally in a zero-proﬁt equilibrium, where a new entrant perceives
zero net payoﬀ, given the costs of ﬁnding prospective customers. But once found, some of
the customers are very proﬁtable. The resources dissipated by brokers in their search for
overpaying customers is, from a social point of view, mostly economic waste.
3 Data and Data Description Model
3.1 Description of the FHA data
Table 1 describes the relevant variables in our sample of 1,525 FHA brokered loans. We
excluded loans with rates below 7 percent and those with interest rates not at 1/8 point ticks
as presumptively subsidized. Interest rates are fairly tightly clustered around 7 1/2 percent.
All the loans were made at essentially the same time, so the variation arises in the cross
section of borrowers and not from changes in credit markets. The total closing charges—cash
closing charge plus yield-spread premium—average $4,111, but have substantial dispersion.
The cash component is typically a little under half of the total charge and the YSP a little
more than half. The principal is generally around $100,000 and rarely exceeds $200,000. The
average credit score of the borrower is 659, which is just below the median of the national
distribution of scores. The fractions of the borrowers who are members of minorities are
close to the U.S. average in the population, at 11 percent African-American and 14 percent
Latino. The last statistic is the fraction of the adult population in the borrower’s census
tract who hold a BA degree—its average level is 21 percent. We have no measure of the
education of individual borrowers, but are able to measure the education of their neighbors
because we know the addresses of the borrowers.
Table 2 shows the distribution of the loans by interest rate. The 7 1/2 percent loan is by
far the most popular.
3.2 The yield-spread premium
As we discussed in the previous section, the YSP is a payment from the wholesale lender to
the broker based on the coupon rate for the mortgage and on the amount of the principal.




Total closing charge, dollars 4,111 2,291
Percent of closing cost paid in cash 40 42
Principal, dollars 112,907 39,891
Credit score 659 63
Percent African-American 11
Percent Latino 14
Percent of neighbors with BA degrees 21 12
Number of loans 1525
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Brokered Loans
Interest rate Percent of sample
7 15.0
7 1/8 to 7 3/8 22.5
7 1/2 38.8
7 5/8 to 7 7/8 12.5
8 and higher 11.2
Table 2: Frequency Distribution of Interest Rates
14Interest rate in 
category,
percent










7 to 7 3/8 7.17 1.33 0.60
7 1/2 7.50 2.32 0.59
7 5/8 to 7 7/8 7.78 2.68 0.83
8 and higher 8.11 3.18 1.13
Table 3: Average Yield-Spread Premiums in the FHA Data, by Interest Rate
we believe is highly reliable evidence about the formula for the YSP from rate sheets. Here
we examine the information in the FHA data on the YSP, which provides a diﬀerent view
of the formula. The source of the FHA broker compensation data is the HUD-1 settlement
statement, required by RESPA. This source is potentially imperfect, because there seems to
be relatively little monitoring of the accuracy of a broker’s disclosure and the broker may
try to conceal a large premium from a borrower. Table 3 shows the average yield-spread
premium for the brokered loans in our sample, by interest rate.
Figure 6 compares the relation between the coupon rate and the YSP in the FHA loans
and in the rate sheets we discussed earlier. The error bars are the standard errors of the
average in each category (hardly visible for the FHA data because of the large number of
observations). The curve for the rate sheets lies to the right of the curve for the FHA
data because mortgage rates were higher in general in 2000 than in 2001. The slope of
the premium is generally lower in the FHA data. The diﬀerence in the slope could reﬂect
changes in expectations about pre-payments and changes in the slope of the yield curve
between 2000 and 2001. It could also reﬂect some tendency for brokers to understate their
actual premiums when they are high. Because the yield-spread premiums reported in the
FHA data are not obviously at odds with those in the rate sheets, and because we are unable
to adjust the curve from 2000 to improve measurement of the premiums actually paid for
the FHA mortgages, we will accept the reported premiums for the rest of our analysis.
Table 5 describes ﬁve cases that we use to illustrate the implications of the results of
the 100. Each case perturbs the base speciﬁcation along one dimension of the explanatory
variables. We do not include a case for a Latino borrower because our results show little
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Figure 6: Comparison of Yield-Spread Premiums in FHA Loans and Lenders’ Rate Sheets
3.3 Descriptive model
A broker receives revenue
τ = L + Y (r) (4)
from originating a mortgage at coupon rate r. In section 2.2, we noted that brokers are
surely unconcerned about the mix between the cash from the borrower, L, and the cash
from the lender, Y (r), and that the typical borrower should be close to indiﬀerent about the
mix as well. The near-indiﬀerence suggests we should start by studying the sum.
All earlier research on mortgage terms has examined the expectation of τ or its compo-
nents conditional on a vector of observed characteristics, via regression. Our interest extends
to the entire distribution of τ conditional on characteristics, a vastly more complicated ob-
ject than the expectation. Our approach is to estimate the quantiles τi(x) of the distribution
as functions of the observed characteristics x. The quantile gives the value of τ such that
the probability that τ is no greater than τi(x) has a designated value, qi. It is the inverse of
the cumulative distribution function F(τ):
F(τi(x)) = qi, (5)
where qi is the designated probability for quantile i. We take the probability values to be:
















Credit score, hundreds -0.05
(0.10)
Fraction of neighbors 
with BAs
Intercept




Table 4: Estimates of the Parameters of the Function Describing the Median of the Total
Closing Charge
where βi is the vector of parameters describing the ith percentile of the distribution of τ,
conditional on x. See Koenker and Hallock (2001) for a discussion of the estimation of
quantiles. Our use of quantile estimation is only to transform the data into a form that
is useful for further analysis. The transformation has the same kind of role that a Fourier
transform of the data has in time-series analysis.
Table 4 shows the equation for the median (i = 150) of the closing charges for the
mortgages in the FHA data, using the variables from Table 1. The median rises sharply
with the amount of the principal. The median charge is $2,842 higher for a mortgage with
a principal of $200,000 compared to one with a principal of $100,000. African-American
borrowers pay median closing charges that are $939 above those of otherwise similar white
borrowers and Latino borrowers pay $912 higher more than white borrowers. Borrowers
from census tracts with higher educational attainment pay smaller total closing charges—an
increase of one standard deviation (12 percentage points) lowers the median cost by $300.
Finally, the borrower’s credit score has a small negative relation to the median—100 extra
points lowers the median charge by $55. The last result is consistent with our observation
earlier that the broker has no stake in the mortgage itself. The results in this table are similar
to those found in earlier work in the regression framework. We estimated the standard errors
in this and all subsequent tables by bootstrap.
Table 5 shows the deﬁnitions of ﬁve illustrative cases we carry through the rest of the
paper, together with the estimated median for each case. Our base case, in the ﬁrst column,



















Percent of neighbors 
with BA degree 21 21 45 21 21
Credit score 650 650 650 650 800
Estimated median 
total charge, dollars
3,194 4,132 2,592 6,033 3,111
(39) (210) (121) (135) (132)
Difference from 
base case, dollars
938 -602 2,839 -83
(210) (121) (135) (132)
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses.
Case
Table 5: Five Illustrative Cases
adults have BAs. The median total closing charge for the base case is $2,185. The other
cases involve perturbations of the variables in the equation. Note that all of the diﬀerences
between the cases and the base case are statistically unambiguous, except for the high credit-
score case.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 illustrate how we handle the entire distribution implied by our
descriptive model, for the base case deﬁned in Table 5. We compare the raw distribution
implied by the model to a smoothed distribution that we use for subsequent analysis. The
raw cumulative distribution is the graph of the percentiles on the vertical axis and the
ﬁtted values for the base case from our quantile estimates on the horizontal axis. This
graph demonstrates how a set of quantile estimates describes a distribution conditional on
a given point in the space of characteristics, x. Notice that it has small wiggles arising
from sampling variation. Figure 8 shows the density constructed from the raw cumulative





Notice that the wiggles in the cumulative distribution turn into huge sawtooth ﬂuctuations
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Figure 7: Raw and Smoothed Cumulative Distribution Functions for the Base Case
in the raw density. It is a well-known statistical problem that the estimate of a density at
a point is not consistent. But a kernel smoother of a density is consistent. Figure 8 shows
the standard kernel smoother of the raw density. Then looking back at Figure 7, one can
see that applying the smoother does little to alter the shape of the cumulative distribution.
Figure 9 shows the smoothed densities that the descriptive model implies for the base
case in Table 5, along with the smoothed density for the actual distribution of total closing
charges in the FHA data. The model pictures the actual distribution as the mixture of
the distributions conditional on the x-characteristics. These distributions gain their shapes
almost entirely from the underlying data. Our ﬁtted model, with 299×6=1 ,794 estimated
coeﬃcients, is hardly restrictive. The actual distribution has a bulge around $6,000 relative
to the distribution for the base case, reﬂecting the presence of loans with higher principal
and other factors associated with higher total closing charges than in the base case.
Figure 10 compares the distribution for African-American borrowers to the distribution
for the base case. The mode for the African-Americans is only about $700 higher than for
the white borrowers with otherwise similar characteristics in the base case, but the upper
tail is much thicker for the African-Americans. Their density is more than double that of the
base-case borrowers at a total closing charge of $6,000, a great deal of money for originating
a loan for $100,000.
Figure 11 compares the distribution for borrowers having more educated neighbors to
the distribution for the base case. These borrowers have a substantial advantage over those
in the base case. We believe that the advantage comes mainly from the likelihood that the
190.8
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Figure 10: Smoothed Densities for the Base Case and for the Case of an Otherwise Similar
African-American Borrower
borrower or a family member is better educated, but living among better-educated people
may also confer an advantage because the environment contains more people who grasp the
principles of shopping for a well-priced origination. The group with more educated neighbors
has a very much lower density than does the base case for the range from $5,000 to $7,000.
Even among those with educated neighbors, a signiﬁcant minority pay what appear to be
extreme total closing charges.
Figure 12 compares the distribution for loans with high principal ($200,000) to the dis-
tribution for the base case ($100,000). The distribution for the larger mortgages lies far to
the right of the distribution for the base case. The powerful relationship with the amount
of the transaction is a puzzling feature of many ﬁnancial services. Little of the work of a
mortgage broker scales with the amount of the principal, but the modal and median charge
for a $200,000 mortgage is about double that of a $100,000 mortgage. The upper tail for the
bigger principal is quite thick—a few people pay astronomical closing charges for the larger
mortgages.
The diﬀerence between the base case and the case with a higher credit score, shown in
Figure 13, is instructive. For all but the high values of the closing charge, the two densities
are similar, reaching peaks at about the same value, but with lower probability for all of the
lower values in the case of the higher credit score. All of the diﬀerence is at the upper end,
where the base case has much more probability above τ =$ 7 ,000. Apparently borrowers





















Total closing cost, thousands of dollars























Total closing cost, thousands of dollars























Total closing cost, thousands of dollars
Figure 13: Smoothed Densities for the Base Case and for the Case of a Higher Credit Score
underwriting works mainly with a cutoﬀ credit score, which the base case satisﬁes. Perhaps
borrowers with credit scores close to the minimum acceptable score are less willing to shop,
because they do not realize that their scores are acceptable to all FHA lenders.
4 Consumer Confusion
We believe that our results reveal substantial consumer confusion, in the sense that the
process of obtaining a mortgage through a broker results in many borrowers paying far more
for the broker’s origination services than they would if they better understood how to shop
for a mortgage and if they understood that the broker was not doing their shopping for them.
Our ﬁrst approach to supporting this conclusion is to ﬁt a suitable model of optimal shopping
to our data and then observe that the payoﬀ to more intensive shopping—speciﬁcally, the
beneﬁt of getting a quote from an additional broker—is far higher than seems reasonable.
Borrowers behave as if it costs over $1,000 to get a quote from another broker. Of course,
we cannot rule out the alternative conclusion that shopping among brokers for the best deal
has such a high psychic cost that the choice to limit shopping is a rational response to that
high cost.
234.1 Modeling market equilibrium with rational shopping
A recent literature considers the econometric problem of inferring shopping costs from market
data. Hong and Shum (2006) and Horta¸ csu and Syverson (2004) are notable contributions,
and Moraga-Gonz´ alez (2006) is a recent survey. This literature considers posted prices—
consumers visit stores and buy from the one with the best posted oﬀering. We have not found
any empirical model in that literature that would apply to the problem we consider here,
even if we accepted the assumption of posted prices. Hong and Shum follow Burdett and
Judd (1983) in assuming that all sellers have the same cost. That assumption is untenable in
our data, because it implies that the common value of cost must be lower than the smallest
observed price. We ﬁnd a tiny fraction of prices that are only a few hundred dollars. We
can only make sense out of the data under the assumption of fairly heterogeneous cost. In
any case, the heterogeneity of broker eﬀort in the origination process, where some borrowers
provide all the needed documents in proper form when ﬁrst asked, while others need extensive
help in preparing the documents, seems to preclude any assumption of equal cost for all
originations.
On the other hand, Horta¸ csu and Syverson’s 2004 study of mutual funds assumes het-
erogeneity in both seller product cost and buyer cost of search, the case we believe describes
the mortgage market. Their results support the conclusion that consumers suﬀer confusion
in their choices of mutual funds by failing to shop hard enough for a low expense ratio. But
they use the market shares of sellers to identify the two distributions, along with the observed
distribution of posted prices (in their case, of mutual funds). Their approach is suitable to
a market where each seller posts the same price for all buyers. Mortgage brokers tailor their
proposals to individual borrowers, so the assumption fails in our case. In addition, we lack
data on origination volume by broker.
The assumption of posted prices seems out of place in the mortgage origination market.
The essence of a posted price is a commitment not to consider a counteroﬀer from a customer.
Posted prices make sense in Internet commerce, studied by Hong and Shum (2006) and many
others, and in regulated mutual funds, studied by Horta¸ csu and Syverson (2004). Mortgage
brokers, mostly working as individuals or in small groups, have no technology to commit
to a stated price. If a borrower turns down an oﬀer and makes a plausible case in favor of
a lower closing charge, the broker may well make a better oﬀer rather than risk losing the
business. For a discussion of this issue in the labor market, see Hall and Krueger (2010).
As far as we know, there are no similar papers on negotiated prices. The theoretical study
closest to the problem that a borrower faces in the mortgage origination market is McAfee
and McMillan (1988). That paper considers the optimal strategy for commercial procurement
from suppliers with heterogeneous costs. The optimal mechanism induces potential suppliers
to reveal their costs; the buyer continues to play the revelation game with additional potential
24suppliers until the beneﬁt from adding another falls short of the cost of playing the game
again.
We take a view that is a simpliﬁcation of McAfee and McMillan (1988) suited to the
case where the buyer is a borrower seeking origination services from a broker. Rather than
inducing the revelation of cost, which would require a strong commitment to a sealed-bid
second-price auction setup, we suppose that the borrower seeks initial quotes from N brokers,
uses the quotes to extract better proposals, until the process ends with one quote that no
other broker is willing to beat. This process is an English or Vickrey or second-price auction.
Modeling of markets based on these auctions is made easier by the fact that bidding behavior
is non-strategic. By standard auction principles, the best ultimate bid is the reservation value
(cost) of the second-lowest-cost bidder. Because the winning bidder does not reveal cost, the
bidder is protected from opportunistic action by the borrower based on a departure from the
McAfee-McMillan commitment, by making a counteroﬀer to that bidder at a charge lower
than the second-lowest but above the winner’s cost. We also believe that borrowers who get
the best deals on mortgage origination actually do their shopping the way that we model
the process.
Notice that we are making an assumption of commitment by the borrower to decline to
engage in further bargaining with the sole remaining bidder once the second-place broker
has dropped out. The borrower accepts the last oﬀer from the winner rather than making a
counteroﬀer. We believe this assumption is generally realistic and it has the further advantage
of leading to a simple and clean way to interpret the observed distribution of closing charges.
In this view of shopping, there is all the diﬀerence in the world between shopping from a
single broker and from two. The model holds that the broker can extract all of the surplus in
a bargain with the borrower, where the borrower’s outside option is to accept the runner-up
bid. In the case of a single bid, the outside option is no mortgage, meaning that the broker
can extract the entire surplus from the purchase of a house or the reﬁnance of a mortgage.
Because we have no way to measure that surplus, we consider only the cases of two or more
bidding brokers.
Let B(k) be the cumulative distribution of loan origination cost among brokers—the
fraction of brokers whose cost is no greater than k. The closing charge τ is the cost level of
the runner-up in the bidding for the business of a borrower. We let H(τ) be the cumulative
distribution of the total origination charge τ among borrowers.
The relation between the two distributions is easy to derive. The probability that a
random draw of broker’s cost is greater than τ is 1 − B(τ). The probability that none of N
draws is as low as τ is (1 − B(τ))N. The probability that one of N draws is as low as τ is
NB(τ)(1 − B(τ))N−1. The probability that two draws or more are as low as τ (that is, the
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Figure 14: Distributions of Broker Cost Inferred from the Hypotheses that Borrowers Shop
among 2, 3, and 4 Mortgage Brokers, Base Case
second-lowest draw is not greater than τ) is one minus these two probabilities:
H(τ)=1− (1 − B(τ))
N − NB(τ)(1 − B(τ))
N−1. (8)
We ﬁnd the B distribution in the following way: On a grid of values of B in [0,1], we
evaluate the right-hand side of equation (8) and associate it with the value of τ where H(τ)
is closest to that value. We take that value of B and k = τ to be a point on the distribution
of broker cost, B(k). The set of values of k that emerges from this process is a resampling
of the original set of values of τ such that the values appear according to the distribution of
broker cost rather than the original distribution of closing charges. Every borrower pays a
charge that is equal to some broker’s cost—that broker was the runner-up in the negotiation.
That is why we relabel τ as k. We use a standard kernel smoothing density estimator on
the resample to ﬁnd the smoothed density of broker cost.
Figure 14 shows the distributions of broker cost for the cases where borrowers shop from
N = 2, 3, and 4 brokers. Because more intensive shopping results in charges that are closer
to cost, the distributions for higher numbers of brokers involve generally higher costs, so
as to rationalize the same observed distribution of total charges. All of the distributions,
including the one for the case of least intensive shopping from only two brokers, suggest that
the implied level of cost is quite high for most mortgages and that the upper tail of cost
includes completely implausible costs.
Figure 15 shows the implied distributions for the ﬁve cases in the case of shopping from
26Base case African American borrower
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Figure 15: Distributions of Broker Cost Inferred from the Hypothesis that Borrowers shop
from Two Brokers, for the Five Cases
only two brokers. The distribution for the high-principal loans lies far to the right—if it is
true that borrowers only shop from two brokers, the cost of originating loans with principals
of $200,000 is far higher that that of smaller loans, a conclusion we ﬁnd unlikely. The
alternative interpretation is that borrowers seeking bigger loans often shop from only one
broker, who is able to capture some part of the surplus that the borrower enjoys from buying
the house, which will generally be larger for more expensive houses. A borrower dealing with
only one broker faces an outside option in the bargain of not buying the house at all, while the
shopper who knows to go to at least one other broker has the outside option of dealing with
that broker. The tendency for consumers to leave more on the table for large transactions
has been widely reported in the literature on consumer behavior.
4.2 Beneﬁts that borrowers failed to gain from more intensive
shopping
Our next step provides the main message of the paper—mortgage borrowers could save really
a lot of money by shopping harder, from more brokers. Based on our results above on the
distribution of cost among brokers, and on the survey evidence cited earlier in the paper, we
conclude that few borrowers shop from more than two brokers and there are signs, such as the
huge and implausible implied extra broker cost of high-principal mortgages, that borrowers
often shop from only a single broker.
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Figure 16: Distributions of Broker Charges Paid by a Base-Case Borrower Shopping from
Two, Three, and Four Brokers, When the Distribution of Broker Cost is the One Inferred
from the Hypothesis that Borrowers Shop from Only Two Brokers
If we had outside information about the distribution of costs among brokers, we could
calculate the beneﬁt of shopping from two, three, or four brokers (or even more), by solving
for the distribution of second-lowest costs, on the assumption that a borrower ought to be
able to bargain the lowest-cost broker down to the reservation price of the second-lowest
one. Lacking such outside information, the best we can do is to take the implied broker cost
distribution for two-broker shopping and calculate the better distributions of total closing
charges that borrowers would pay if the shopped from three or four brokers. Figure 16 shows
the results. It displays the distributions of the closing charges that a base-case borrower
would pay, given the broker cost distribution inferred on the hypothesis that borrowers shop
from only two brokers, for alternative shopping strategies involving shopping from two, three,
and four brokers. The distributions shift substantially to the left for each added broker.
Table 6 shows the median gains that would be achieved from more intensive shopping,
for the cases we have been considering. The gain from going to one additional broker ranges
from $836 for the white borrowers with smaller mortgages and high credit scores (who seem
to shop more eﬀectively than other groups, or who perhaps seem more savvy to brokers and
consequently get better quotes from them) to a colossal $1,866 for the borrowers seeking a
high-principal loan. These gains rise to $1,197 and $2,664 for adding a fourth broker. We
conclude that borrowers are failing to use a simple method to obtain better deals on their













Mean gain from shopping from 
one additional broker, dollars 971 1,260 893 1,842 841
(32) (84) (69) (109) (50)
Mean gain from shopping from 
two additional brokers, dollars 1,377 1,815 1,221 2,626 1,200
(42) (120) (93) (143) (73)
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses
Case
Table 6: Median Reduction in Total Closing Charge by Shopping from Three or Four Brokers,
given Broker Cost Distribution Corresponding to Shopping from Only Two Brokers, for the
Five Cases
the bargaining process that they are knowingly over-paying their brokers, we believe that
a lack of awareness of the advantage of more intensive shopping is a bigger part of the
explanation. Brokers seem to have mastered the art of dissuading their customers from
doing the kind of shopping that comes naturally for other expensive purchases.
4.3 Distribution of the broker’s margin
Under our conclusion that mortgage customers shop from only two brokers, we can calculate
the distribution of the broker’s margin—the amount that borrowers leave on the table, in
the sense that they pay more than the broker’s reservation price, which is his cost. The
margin is the diﬀerence between the actual charge, the cost of the broker with the higher of
the two costs, and the broker’s own cost, the lower of the two costs. The Appendix explains
how we calculate this distribution. Figure 17 shows the distribution of the margin, along
with the distributions of the broker’s cost by loan, and the distribution of the total closing
charge. Note that the distribution of broker cost by loan lies to the left of the distribution
of cost by broker, shown in Figure 14, because the shopping process gives more business
to the lower-cost brokers. The low-cost brokers appear more often among loans than their
share of the broker population. The distribution of cost by loan is somewhat irregular in
comparison to the other distributions shown in this paper, because the minimum function
gives high weight to the shape of the distribution of cost for fairly low cost. The irregularity
is a feature of the underlying data, not an artifact of our calculation process.
Note that the distribution of broker margin in Figure 17 is not terribly diﬀerent from the
exponential that Berndt et al. (2009) assume in their approach to measuring the distribution
of broker cost. But they also assume that cost is normally distributed, an assumption less
290.6
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Figure 17: Distributions of Broker Margin, Broker Cost, and Total Closing Charge, by Loan
supported by our results. Of course, their approach has the advantage that it does not rest,
as ours does, on a strong assumption about borrowers’ shopping strategies.
5 The Division of the Closing Charge between Cash
and the YSP
Earlier we noted that the function governing the YSP, as revealed in our data from actual rate
sheets, has a shape that makes some borrower-broker pairs essentially indiﬀerent between
using the borrower’s cash to pay the broker and borrowing the funds to pay the broker.
Given that conclusion, we have studied the total payment. In this section, we explore the
division of the total payment between the two sources.
We construct the variable s = L
L+Y for each loan, the fraction of the total closing cost
paid in cash. Thus a “no-cost” loan, where the broker receives only the YSP, has s = 0, while
a loan at the par coupon rate, with zero YSP, has s = 1. Figure 18 shows the distribution
of s among the loans in the FHA sample. The modal loan’s total closing cost is around
half cash and half YSP. Loans with closing costs paid mostly in cash—the right side of the
distribution—are relatively rare. Loans with closing costs paid mostly through the YSP are
not common, but constitute an important minority.
Our earlier discussion of the choice of the division between cash and YSP suggests that
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Figure 18: Smoothed Density of the Fraction of Total Closing Cost Paid in Cash
time she expects to keep the loan—and the division. Those with higher discount rates and
lower keeping times opt for mostly YSP and vice versa. In that case, we can treat the
observed value of the division, s, as a personal characteristic of the borrower. To pursue
this idea, we divide the range of s (the unit interval, aside from a few with negative cash or
negative YSP, which are included in the ﬁrst and last bins) into ten equal bins and introduce
the corresponding ten dummy variables into our earlier estimation framework. We remove
the constant, which is the sum of the dummy variables.
Table 7 shows the results for four estimating equations, stated as the implied values of
the total closing cost at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentile points and at the mean. The
bottom estimate is for the mean and is estimated by regression. In general, borrowers who
opt to fund their total closing costs mainly with the YSP, at the left edge of the table, pay
less in total closing costs. Those who opt to pay with cash alone, at the right edge, pay less
than those in the middle if they are below or at the median, but not if they are high payers,
in the 90th percentile.
The estimates for the 10th percentile describe the relationship between s and the total
closing charge τ among borrowers whose total closing charges are quite low compared to the
majority—that is, 90 percent of the borrowers pay more than this group. That point occurs
at the very low level of $1,366 in total closing charges for those who relied almost entirely
on the YSP to pay those charges. The 10th percentile occurs at about double that level of
total payment in the more popular case where the borrower pays 30 to 40 percent of the
total in cash and the rest from the YSP. The 10th percentile falls back to lower levels among
31Fraction of Total Closing Cost Paid in Cash
Total Closing Cost in the Base Case, by Division between Cash and YSP, Dollars
Estimation 0.0 to 0.1 0.1 to 0.2 0.2 to 0.3 0.3 to 0.4 0.4 to 0.5 0.5 to 0.6 0.6 to 0.7 0.7 to 0.8 0.8 to 0.9 0.9 to 1.0
1,366 1,825 2,116 2,636 2,369 2,120 2,082 1,884 1,682 1,063 Quantile, 10th 
percentile (171) (219) (79) (147) (151) (105) (91) (116) (286) (518)
2,393 2,594 3,186 3,837 3,515 3,436 3,793 3,895 3,375 2,827
(88) (83) (107) (90) (101) (115) (338) (402) (451) (506)
percentile
Quantile,
median (88) (83) ( 07) (90) (0) (5 ) (338) (0) (5) (506)
3,500 3,971 4,701 4,813 5,613 6,245 8,460 8,227 7,167 6,491
(148) (284) (255) (126) (365) (230) (584) (953) (823) (888)
Quantile, 90th 
percentile
2,237 2,501 3,257 3,730 3,786 3,827 4,432 4,595 3,787 3,392
(108) (129) (113) (95) (113) (132) (221) (318) (375) (491)
Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses
Regression,
mean
Table 7: Estimates of the Relation between the Division of Funding the Total Closing Cost
between Cash and YSP and the Amount of the Total Closing Cost
those who rely mostly on cash, though observations in that category are sparse and make
the decline statistically ambiguous.
The results for the typical borrower, viewed as the median (second set of estimates) or
mean (fourth set of estimates), also show a substantial advantage for those choosing not to
pay in cash or to pay only a small fraction in cash. The advantage of paying less than 10
percent in cash relative to the total closing charge paid by those using 30 to 40 percent cash
is $1,444 in the median and $1,493 in the mean. But these borrowers with typical shopping
prowess do not gain a similar advantage if they use all cash—at the median, they save around
$1,010 compared to borrowers who use a fairly even mix of cash and YSP.
The results for the least-successful shoppers, those at the 90th percentile for the total
origination charge, show a huge advantage for the low-cash shopping strategy, though even
the borrowers in the lowest-cash category pay a total closing charge at the high level of
$3,500, almost triple the level of the 10th percentile group. Unlike the other percentiles
and the mean, in this group, the total closing payment keeps rising with the cash share up
to 70 percent cash, where the total payment is $8,460, an astronomical amount to pay for
origination services for a $100,000 mortgage.
We conclude that all borrowers who opt to rely on the YSP to fund their origination
costs rather than paying a mixture of YSP and cash are likely to make better deals.
To interpret the ﬁndings in Table 7, we consider a number of hypotheses:
• Baseline: The borrower has a given s. The borrower and broker negotiate a total
32closing charge τ that is uncorrelated with s. The two components of the payment to
the broker are the cash charge L = sτ and the YSP Y =( 1− s)τ.
• High-discount disadvantage: High-discount borrowers are more costly for the broker
to serve and place lower value on the deferred payments to ﬁnance the yield-spread
premium Y , so on both accounts the total origination charge τ is higher for the low-
s borrowers who rely on the yield-spread premium to save themselves scarce current
cash.
• Marginal home purchasers: Some borrowers are only barely able to manage the pur-
chase of the house they are trying to ﬁnance. Not only are they short of cash to pay the
broker, but they have hardly enough income to qualify for the loan. They need a low s
because of their cash shortage, but cannot qualify for much of a yield-spread premium.
Because they have a credible threat not to complete the purchase, the broker is forced
to oﬀer a total closing charge τ close to his cost.
• Single-dimension shopping advantage: Borrowers who elect no-cost loans (s=0) or
those with low cash charges can shop for the lowest coupon rate without having to
balance the cash charge against the coupon rate; they have no trouble determining
the best deal among a set of proposed mortgages. Similarly, those who elect no yield-
spread premium and thus to pay the par coupon rate can shop for the lowest cash
charge. A third possibility for no-cost loans is that setting the broker’s expectations
that no cash will be paid by the borrower at closing precludes the broker from nibbling
by adding on additional smaller fees, such as fax or courier fees.
The results refute the baseline hypothesis. Under that hypothesis, conditioning on the
cash share s would not change the distribution of the total origination charge τ. Table 7
shows a strong tendency for the borrowers who contribute less cash, with low values of s,
to pay substantially less by all four measures. The results plainly establish an interaction
between s and the total origination charge.
The results also refute the hypothesis of a high-discount disadvantage. The view seems
plausible that these borrowers are more costly to serve, because the same factors that cause
them to have high discounts also means that they have trouble ﬁnding the needed documents,
ﬁlling out applications, and performing the other steps in the application process. Brokers
probably do more hand-holding for high-discount borrowers. By deﬁnition, these borrowers
place a lower discounted value on the future coupon payments that fund the yield-spread
premium, another factor that would help the broker extract a high total closing charge. Our
earlier analysis showed that high-discount borrowers will opt for low-s loans. High-discount
borrowers will more often lack the cash to pay the broker up front. All of these plausible
considerations point toward higher total broker charges for the low-s borrowers. But the
33evidence in Table 7 is that these borrowers pay thousands of dollars less than those with s
around 0.5.
Table 7 supports the hypothesis that marginal home purchasers get better deals from
their brokers. They beneﬁt in the same way that the shabby buyer in the souk who turns his
pockets inside out to show that he has only $3 to buy the fez is likely to get the fez for that
price, while a normal tourist can’t get it for less than $10. The marginal home purchaser
can’t pay the broker much in cash and can’t qualify for a mortgage with a high enough
coupon to support much of a yield-spread premium, so the broker has the choice between
doing origination for only a small proﬁt or not doing it at all. The marginal home purchaser
gets a low-price origination without shopping hard.
Finally, the results in Table 7 support the hypothesis that consumers shop better when
the price has a single dimension. This hypothesis helps explain why the borrowers with high
values of s do somewhat better, as well as explaining the striking advantage of the more
common single-dimension shopping strategy based on the no-cost loan. The borrowers with
intermediate values of s seem to respond to the cash and YSP elements of the total charge
as if they had nothing to do with each other—at the 10th percentile, they pay $1,185 for
each element at s =0 .5. Those who choose to pay only one component—either Y or L but
not both—incur only half the total cost of those who pay with both. Borrowers behave as if
they are unaware that incurring a higher YSP should entitle them to a lower cash payment.
We conclude that, among the four hypotheses, the data plainly support those relating to
marginal house purchasers and single-dimension shopping strategies, while the data refute
the baseline hypothesis and the hypothesis of a disadvantage for high-discount borrowers.
6 Concluding Remarks
Untrained, inexperienced borrowers interact with specialist mortgage brokers in an impor-
tant segment of the mortgage origination market. Brokers earn two kinds of compensation,
explicit charges the borrower pays in cash at the closing and a commission the lender pays
based on the spread between the coupon rate the borrower agrees to and the par mortgage
interest rate. Both types of broker compensation seem to generate confusion. The fee to the
broker at closing is not called “broker’s fees” or anything like that. Rather, it is a confus-
ing array of charges, each seeming to cover some aspect of origination costs, together with,
in many cases, a charge for “points”. Almost everybody, including regulators and many
economists, seem to believe that points have a mechanical relation to a reduced interest
rate, when in fact the term points is nothing more than another category for the broker’s
charge.
When interpreted in the context of a minimal amount of shopping among borrowers for
broker services—shopping from a pair of brokers—the data support the proposition that
34a substantial fraction of borrowers would beneﬁt substantially by shopping from additional
brokers. The data also suggest that simplifying shopping by considering only loans where the
broker receives all his compensation from the lender and the borrower pays no cash closing
charge results in substantially better terms for borrowers. The borrowers who receive the
worst terms tend to pay both large cash charges and to agree to high interest rates that give
the broker large additional compensation in the form of the yield-spread premium.
Although brokers tend to make large margins over cost in each origination, we do not
believe that they earn incomes above those available from other lines of work. Rather, they
dissipate the margin by putting extra eﬀort into getting in touch with prospective borrowers.
Equilibrium in the broker origination market appears to be ineﬃcient. If borrowers spent
more eﬀort getting in touch with more brokers—which is easy—brokers would earn less
margin and would dissipate less eﬀort trying to locate shy borrowers.
With respect to policy changes that might help achieve the more eﬃcient equilibrium,
we believe in evidence-based design. Disclosure law has historically been in the hands of
lawyers, who design dense forms that may help absolve their clients of blame for consumer
error, but which do little to help consumers ﬁnd better deals. A new movement to design
disclosures that are proven to be helpful, through ﬁeld experiments, may result in some
progress. We are inclined to believe that simple admonitions, such as “mortgage brokers are
salesmen and the only way to get a good deal is to shop and bargain” and “you are more
likely to get a good deal if you shop for no-cost loans” are more likely to yield improvements
than, for example, trying to teach borrowers enough ﬁnancial economics to understand the
tradeoﬀ between cash and the interest rate.
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37Appendix (Not for publication)
A Earlier Research
We review earlier research on mortgage closing charges, along with research on mortgage
interest rates, non-real-estate consumer lending, and car-buying, that is relevant to this
study. The auto and auto-lending markets are similar to the mortgage market in that
transactions have large dollar values and prices are negotiated.
A.1 Research on mortgage costs
Woodward (2003) studied complete mortgage terms—loan rate plus lender/broker upfront
charges, the YSP, and charges for other settlement services. She investigated the relation
between the closing charges that borrowers pay directly and those they pay indirectly through
the YSP, ﬁnding that a dollar of added YSP is associated with only a 55-cent decline in direct
charges. This ﬁnding suggests that borrowers may not be aware that a higher mortgage
interest rate puts cash in the broker’s pocket that the borrower should be able to extract
from the broker by insisting on a lower direct closing charge.
Another ﬁnding in Woodward’s study was that borrowers who rolled all closing costs into
the rate on their loan, by negotiating a direct charge of zero, paid total closing costs that
were $1,500 lower than those of other borrowers, other things equal. Borrowers who shop on
rate alone may be ﬁnancially more savvy than other borrowers, or may simply beneﬁt from
a shopping strategy that allows them to compare loans with only a single number, rate, and
liberate themselves from attempting the rate-point trade-oﬀ.
Courchane and Nickerson (1997) studied the interest rates and the charges labeled as
points, but not other cash charges, on loans from retail bank lenders. Direct lenders have
internal rate sheets. Some borrowers are quoted a standard rate, and some are quoted
from other cells having higher interest rates on the rate sheet. When a borrower pays an
interest rate higher than the standard rate, the diﬀerence is called an “overage”. Overages
are economically equivalent to yield-spread premiums. Courchane and Nickerson ﬁnd that
minorities on average pay more in overages than do other borrowers. Studying a diﬀerent
set of lenders, Black, Boehm and DeGennaro (2001) also found that minorities pay higher
overages. Neither of these studies has data on cash fees charged to borrowers, so they are
not conclusive about loan terms for minorities. Woodward (2003), using data reporting both
rate and closing fees, did ﬁnd that minority borrowers pay more than other borrowers.
As we noted in the body of the paper, borrowers receive a disclosure form called a Good
Faith Estimate (GFE) prior to committing to a mortgage. Shroder (2007) compared GFEs
to the HUD-1 settlement statements giving the actual terms for 146 FHA loans. He found
38that most GFEs overestimate borrowers’ ultimate cash closing charges by a small amount,
but that for a minority, the GFE under-estimates by a large amount. He also ﬁnds that when
lender/broker charges are higher, so are the charges for title services, a ﬁnding consistent
with the ﬁndings in Woodward (2008) and Woodward (2003). He hypothesizes that this is
consistent with the ”sheep-shearing” view of the market: borrowers vulnerable to over-charge
in one category are vulnerable in others also. The sheep can be sheared on both sides.
Shroder gave special attention to whether transactions showed evidence of uproar (divorce
or unusual delinquency in property taxes) in transactors’ lives. Such uproar could raise
transaction costs by increasing the complexity of the transaction, raising the time pressure
to get the deal closed, or reducing the seller’s or buyer’s resistance to agent opportunism.
He found that transactions with indications of trouble had total lender or broker and title
cash fees that were higher by $1,050, other things equal, in a set where the average was
$2,060. He ﬁnds it implausible that a divorce or delinquent property taxes could so inﬂate
transaction costs. He concludes that the present disclosure rules do not suﬃciently improve
the negotiating position of buyers and sellers relative to service providers to prevent personal
diﬃculties from inﬂuencing the fees they pay. His evidence is less than conclusive because
he did not include the charges labeled as points in his measure of closing costs.
Subprime mortgages are intended for borrowers with higher default risks; their higher
interest rates compensate the lender for that risk. Courchane, Surette and Zorn (2003)
ﬁnd that a signiﬁcant fraction of borrowers eligible for prime loans actually take out more
expensive subprime loans. The authors ﬁnd that the standard predictors of default—credit
scores, assets, and load-to-value ratio—explain much of the diﬀerence in what type of loan
borrowers get, but other factors also matter, including shopping behavior (do borrowers
search for best rates and aﬀordable monthly payments? Are they familiar with mortgage
market terms?), adverse life events (divorce, illness, unemployment, large drop in income),
channel (borrowers using brokers are more likely to get subprime loans than those who use
lenders, other things equal), and age (older borrowers are more likely to have subprime loans,
other things equal). After taking account of these factors, they found no meaningfully higher
likelihood that minorities would take out subprime loans.
Minority borrowers’ loan applications are rejected more often than are the applications of
white borrowers. LaCour-Little (1999) reviews this literature. Higher rejection rates may be
a factor in the reluctance of minority borrowers to shop aggressively for the best mortgage
terms. Research on diﬀerences in rejection rates is inconclusive on the question of whether
higher rates for minorities are the result of discrimination or a lower fraction of qualiﬁed
borrowers among minority applicants for mortgages.
Cohen (2006), for car loans, and Woodward (2003), for mortgages, ﬁnd that African-
American borrowers pay their loan brokers roughly $500 more than do other borrowers. The
diﬀerential for car loans is, of course, a much larger fraction of the amount of the loan.
39The race diﬀerences in broker closing charges result from some combination of taste-based
pure racial discrimination, as described by Becker (1957), diﬀerences in costs of serving
customers not reﬂected in explanatory variables but correlated with race, and diﬀerences
in shopping behavior, possibly the result of racial diﬀerences in the way that shoppers are
treated by mortgage brokers and direct lenders. Less eﬀective shopping and higher rejection
rates may arise from related sources.
A.2 Findings from the Auto-Loan Market
The institutional arrangements of the market for auto loans closely parallel those of the
home mortgage market. Car buyers can get a loan from their local bank or credit union,
or they can arrange ﬁnancing at the point-of-sale with the auto dealer who sells them a
car. The loan broker, usually a separate individual within a dealer’s facility, operates with
a rate sheet similar to the rate sheet of the mortgage broker, but simpler. Car lenders
make ﬁner distinctions on credit quality than do mortgage lenders. The car loan rate sheets
generally have ﬁve credit-quality categories, with lower rates for better credit. As with the
mortgage rate sheet, the lender pays the dealer more for making loans at higher rates, and
this amount is exactly analogous to a yield-spread premium. Cohen (2006) reports that
on average, minority car buyers/borrowers agree to higher rates that result in additional
payment from the wholesale lender to the car dealer of about $500 per loan on new cars
averaging $25,000 in value. One feature of the auto loan market not found in the mortgage
market is that wholesale auto lenders put a ceiling on the upward adjustment of interest
rate for the two highest credit-quality buckets, but not for the lower-quality buckets. Cohen
found that to evade these caps, auto loan brokers sometimes moved borrowers to a lower
quality credit bucket than they merited (based on their credit scores) so as to quote them
higher rates, which were sometimes accepted by the car buyers.
A.3 Research Outside of Lending
Beyond mortgage lending there is considerable research that can help interpret the ﬁndings
in this study. In particular, the research on the purchase terms for cars, which are sold in
markets where price is negotiated, is relevant. The relevant facts and principles found in
this work, discussed in more detail below, are:
1. Education, income, comparison shopping, and tolerance for engaging in negotiation all
have a measurable relation to prices consumers pay in markets for large purchases such
as autos.
2. Minorities and women pay more for cars than do other consumers. Much, but not all,
of the diﬀerence is related to education, income, and the willingness to comparison
40shop and negotiate.
3. Consumers capture a smaller share of the potential gains from trade when they do not
know the size of the potential surplus.
Ayres and Siegelman (1995) found that minorities and women pay more for new cars
than do white men. Scott-Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso (2007) investigated the role
of shopping strategy in these diﬀerentials. They ﬁnd that success in shopping depends on
knowledge of dealer invoice price, visits to additional dealers, patience, and taste or distaste
for bargaining and shopping. The best deals arise from a combination of market knowledge
and willingness to negotiate.
Scott-Morton, Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso (2003) examined auto purchases on and oﬀ
the internet. Oﬄine, women pay 0.5 percent more and minorities an extra 2 percent ($500
again), compared to white men, for equivalent cars. Sixty percent of this price diﬀerential
for in-person shopping is related to income, education, already having a car (making search
costs lower) and taste for shopping. For online car purchases, where customers also negotiate
price, there are no race or sex diﬀerences in car prices.
Aguiar and Hurst (2007) demonstrate the general importance of shopping and comparing
prices, in markets with posted prices, in their study of expenditure, consumption, and time
spent shopping. At retirement, households spend more time shopping and ﬁnd better prices.
Ayres (2001) explores four possible explanations for why minorities and women pay more
for cars. The ﬁrst two are Becker-type discrimination, involving a dislike of the buyer by the
seller. Ayers leans against these sources of diﬀerential treatment because dealerships hire
substantial numbers of minority salespeople and some dealerships are minority-owned, but
nonetheless behave like other dealerships. He then considers the possibility that minority
buyers might have more distaste for bargaining or be more inelastic demanders because they
have less knowledge of market prices. The Scott-Morton et al. studies conﬁrm both as
sources of diﬀerential pricing.
Busse, Silva-Risso and Zettelmeyer (2006) study two diﬀerent types of auto sales promo-
tions. In one, a car maker oﬀered car buyers a $1,000 cash rebate. In another, the car maker
oﬀered $1,000 to dealers who sell such a car. Standard economic analysis suggests that the
two diﬀerent promotions should have identical impacts on price paid and the number of
cars sold. In fact, the two promotions had very diﬀerent results. When the buyers collect
the rebate, both buyer and car salesman know of the existence of the promotion. When
the seller gets the bonus, only the sellers, not the car buyers, know of its existence. When
car buyers get the rebate, consumers get 70 to 90 percent of the beneﬁt of it—their total
price net of the rebate is about $800 lower than with no promotion. When car makers do a
promotion to dealers, consumer beneﬁt is only 30 to 40 percent of the surplus amount. The
promotions direct to consumers were much more successful in selling additional cars than
41were the relatively concealed promotions to salesmen only.
The parallel between the auto dealer promotions and the mortgage market is that the
lender payments to brokers are well understood by the mortgage brokers, but perhaps not by
consumers. But the parallel is not perfect. An important diﬀerence is that the YSP is not a
temporary promotion by lenders, but now a permanent part of how lenders distribute their
wholesale terms to mortgage brokers. Despite the permanence of the wholesale arrangements,
it seems that few consumers understand them.
B Details of Shopping Calculations
B.1 Calculating smoothed densities from quantiles
The standard kernel smoother, such as ksdensity in MatLab, takes a vector interpreted
as a set of random draws from a distribution and returns the smoothed density of that
distribution. Over a mesh Pi = i/M, the quantiles of the distribution F(x) , say xi, with
F(xi)=Pi, can be interpreted as random draws from the distribution—they all have equal
probability. Thus the application of the kernel smoother to xi yields the smoothed density
of x.
B.2 Inferring the distribution of broker cost
Recall that
H(τ)=1− (1 − B(τ))
N − NB(τ)(1 − B(τ))
N−1. (9)
Our approach to inverting this equation to ﬁnd the distribution of broker cost B given the
distribution H from our descriptive model is to ﬁnd the quantiles k(P) such that
H(k(P)) = 1 − (1 − P)
N − NP(1 − P)
N−1. (10)
The distribution P = B(k) is the inverse of the quantile function k(P).
B.3 Inferring the distribution of broker margin
Each borrower makes two independent draws of brokers, with costs ki and kj. The winning
broker’s margin is |ki−kj|. For the 2992 combinations of the two, measured at the percentiles
ki of the broker cost distribution for the base case, we compute the margin. We treat the
resulting vector of margins as a set of independent draws with equal probability from pairs
of brokers. We then apply the kernel smoother to that vector to ﬁnd the smoothed density.
We do the same for min(ki,k j) to ﬁnd the distribution of the cost among loans.
42B.4 Simulating outcomes for more intensive shopping
Given the quantile function for broker cost, k(P), we calculate the distribution, HN(τ)o f
the second-lowest cost, τ, for N = 3 and N = 4 from equation (10), taking τ = k(P). We
invert P = HN(τ) to get the quantile function τN(P).
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